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The Case for Green Energy 
• Climate Change 
• Pollution 
• Energy Security 
• Technological advancements and increasing 
awareness making green energy economically 
viable and politically acceptable 
A Simple Cost-Benefit for Policy Objectives 
Very Low to Very High (1 – 5) 
Source 
Environmental 
Impact 
Capital 
Investment 
Marginal 
Cost 
Political Un-
Acceptance 
Technological 
Hurdles 
Total 
Coal 5 3 3 3 1 3 
Oil 4 3 4 3 1 3 
Gas 3 3 3 2 2 2.6 
Hydro 2 5 1 4 2 2.8 
Nuclear 2 5 1 5 3 3.2 
Biomass
/Biofuel 
2 2 2 2 1 1.8 
Wind 1 4 1 1 4 2.2 
Solar 1 4 1 1 4 2.2 
Wave/ 
Tidal 
1 5 1 1 4 2.4 
Levelized Cost of  Electricity 
Source: IRENA 
Instrument Choice 
• Markets alone will not respond or will be too slow to meet the 
challenges of  climate change and energy security, markets need 
“nudge” 
• Treasury – feed in tariff 
• Regulation – carbon pricing 
• Information – raise political unacceptability of  Coal and Oil and 
acceptability of  Nuclear & Hydro  
• All three instruments work best in tandem and when well 
designed in order to internalize externalities and share 
rents/costs in equitable way 
 
Policy Design Issues 
• Policy makers across the world generally give in 
to the pressures from concentrated interest 
groups and spread the costs of  policy design 
indirectly to diffused population, resulting in: 
– Quantity (cap-and-trade) regulation narrowly targeted 
over direct pricing (carbon tax) broadly 
– Feed-in-tariff  payed from large tax-base 
– Cancelling nuclear and hydro options 
– Redistribution of  rents 
 
Policy Design Issues 
• Since carbon pricing is a highly contentious issue, lack 
of  certainty and ideological dispositions play a critical 
role such as: 
– Exact expected environmental impact 
– Unequal distribution of  the damages and benefits 
– Contributions to carbon stock vs. marginal carbon cost 
– Intergenerational discount rate 
– Liberty and Equity 
• Nevertheless, estimates suggest a USD 15-90 per ton 
CO2, based on various considerations 
• No carbon tax or trading scheme so far has reached 
even close enough to these estimates 
 
 
Carbon Pricing Issues 
• Cap-and-trade schemes are largely ineffective, due to: 
– Caps are overly conservative in their calculations 
– Over allocation of  permits 
– No price-floor 
– Regulatory capture / corruption 
• Carbon tax relatively effective but controversial due to perceptions of  
fairness and distributional impact 
• Fossil fuel lobbies exert enormous pressure in market dominated 
countries or state itself  is involved in fossil production and 
consumption 
• End-use energy price impact remains a politically sensitive issue, 
particularly in absence of  targeted welfare programs (tax rebates, 
lump-sum payments, utility vouchers, etc) and effective demand 
management/energy efficiency policies 
 
 
 
Feed-in-Tariff  Issues 
• FiT policies have not materialized their full potential, due to: 
– Prices offered often do not take market risk into account 
– Grid operators not cooperative despite mandatory regulation 
– Conventional generators lobby against 
– Government owned utilities often lack expertise 
– Largely focused on large investors 
• FiT policies unlikely to be more effective in the absence of  
infrastructure overhaul and an efficient regulatory environment 
• Cost of  infrastructure overhaul need subsidizing 
• There remain technological hurdles in commercializing 
renewables for which not all countries need to jump in the 
“innovation” and “R & D” bandwagon 
 
 
Policy Design 
Considerations 
• Subsidies to the renewable sector in absence of  carbon pricing is 
only effective minimally 
• Carbon pricing alone is not sufficient either 
• More importantly, revenues from carbon pricing shall be directly 
linked to the subsidies, in order to avoid distributional 
distortions 
• Carbon tax far more effective than cap-and-trade 
• End-user needs targeted welfare programs 
• Both the above policies work best along with policies that reduce 
energy demand and increase efficiency  
• Policy makers shall work on increasing political acceptability of  
Nuclear and Hydro and unacceptability of  Coal & Oil 
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